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Fri, 09 Mar 2007:

Being a psuedo-security guy of sorts, I'd decided to jump back into insecurity land a couple of weeks back. I haven't really been into security-tech for quite a long time, having hung up my script kiddie slingshot a long time back. But of late, it has again started to look attractive - but more than mere implementation issues, I've been looking for true blue design issues.

Recently on IRC, dumbhead was defending his default password on his router, which is conveniently firewalled off from the WAN. In my attempts to prove that setup insecure, I discovered DNS Pinning. It has been truly enlightening to perform a cursory attack on a home router with a faked up nameserver (re-used my twisted.names code).

The first request immediately does an iframe with a made-up hostname to ensure that no dns caches interfere. The resolution of that host (say "mordor") looks somewhat like this.

;; QUESTION SECTION:
;mordor.                     IN      A

;; ANSWER SECTION:
mordor.              284     IN      A       xxx.xxx.xx.xx
mordor.              284     IN      A       192.168.1.1

Now there is a good probability that the first IP will be hit nearly immediately by the browser. The server is running a script which tails the access log as soon as that vhost is hit (for dynamic vhosts, install lighttpd-mod-mysql-vhost), marking the vhost in the table as "hit". A sudo'd python script hooks into the mysql table, flips that flag to "block" after running an iptables packet drop on dst port 80, src ip of the victim.

Thirty seconds after loading the first iframe, the code in there creates another iframe with src=document.location+"?xyz". Very soon, that frame loads up 192.168.1.1 in the same domain as the attacking website. I've got a default exploit sequence, which opens up port 22 for the Huawei WA1003A router which BSNL is distributing these days - but this requires the default password to be unchanged.

But the default password might not be required with the more expensive routers. If I could run my first evil iframe on port 2869 to commit the b0rkage, I would essentially be able to access the UPnP which takes a bit of SOAP to reduce the NAT into swiss cheese. But I'm a bit too lazy to actually write out those SOAP calls using XmlHttp (hah, same domain). And all that *without* a single password.

Most people have dismissed the DNS feature as unusable for hacking most websites because it sends invalid Host: headers and without cookies. But none of the routers I've looked at so far care about that or even have javascript checks for iframes (not that it will affect XHR much).

Amazingly simple, elegant. And DNS has been around for only 20 years ...

PS: thanks for providing the domain - you know who you are :)

--
The Domain Name Server (DNS) is the Achilles heel of the Web.
                      -- Sir Tim Berners-Lee

posted at: 04:23 | path: /insecurity | permalink | Tags: , ,